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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
REACTION TO

DID

CONGRESS OVERREACH IN ITS

LAMP/!
INTRODUCTION·

Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19341 and the
accompanying rule lOb-5 2 have been used for over forty-five years
to bring private actions for securities fraud claims in the federal
courtS.3 Since neither the statute nor the accompanying regulation
specify a statute of limitations to be applied in such cases, the fed
eral courts traditionally "borrowed" a statute of limitations from
the state law of the district in which the case was heard. 4 However,
by the late 1980s, some circuits had decided to establish a more
uniform statute of limitations for these claims.5 The resulting "di
vergence of opinion among the [c]ircuits"6 over the proper statute
of limitations led the Supreme Court to take up the issue. 7 The
Court's resolution was to establish a uniform statute of limitations
through its ruling in Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v.
Gilbertson. 8 The Court also held that this new rule was to be ap
plied retroactively.9
The result of the Lamp! decision was that many pending 10b-5
cases which had been commenced in reliance on more lenient stat
utes of limitations were suddenly time-barred. Congress took note
of this 10 and responded by passing an amendment ll to the Securi
1. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, § 10(b), 48 Stat. 881, 891
(codified at 15 U.S.c. § 78j(b) (1988».
2. 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1994).
3. See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
4. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 355
(1991).
5. Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d 1385 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 2887 (1991); Ceres Partners V. GEL Assocs., 918 F.2d 349 (2d Cir. 1990); In re
Data Access Sys. Sec. Litig., 843 F.2d 1537 (3d Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 849 (1988).
6. Lamp/, 501 U.S. at 354.
7. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow V. Gilbertson, 498 U.S. 894 (1990).
8. 501 U.S. 350 (1991).
9. Id. at 364. The decision to apply the rule to the litigants before the Court,
along with the Court's decision in James B. Beam Distilling CO. V. Georgia, 501 U.S.
529 (1991), announced the same day, meant that the new rule would be applied retroac
tively to all pending cases.
10. 137 CONGo REC. S18624 (daily ed. Nov. 27, 1991). "In effect, Lamp/changed
397
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ties Exchange Act reinstating those claims. The legislation, which
was attached to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Im
provement Act of 1991, added section 27A to the Securities Ex
change Act of 1934. Section 27A(a) declared that the applicable
statute of limitations for claims filed prior to the Lamp! decision
would be the statute of limitations applicable in that jurisdiction on
the day before Lamp! was decided. 12 Part (b) of the statute al
lowed plaintiffs whose suits had been dismissed as time-barred on
the basis of Lamp! to petition for reinstatement within sixty days,13
Defendants in 10b-5 actions have claimed that section 27A vio
lates the separation of powers doctrine because it represents an at
tempt by Congress to prescribe judicial decisions 14 or to exercise
direct congressional review of judicial decisions. 1s The United
States Supreme Court has affirmed, by an equally divided vote, a
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit decision holding section
27A(b) constitutional.1 6 Justice O'Connor took no part in the con
sideration or decision of the caseP Certiorari has been granted in
another case dealing with the application of section 27A(b), how
ever, creating another opportunity for the Court to declare whether
section 27A is constitutional.1 8
This Note will review some of the cases dealing with these
claims. Part I will describe the background of the issue, including
the nature of claims under section 10(b) and the federal courts'
prior practice of borrowing the local statute of limitations in those
suits. Part I will also review the decisions in Lampf9 and James B.
Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia,20 which led to the enactment of sec
tion 27A. Finally, Part I will examine that legislation.
the rules in the middle of the game for thousands of fraud victims who already had suits
pending ...." Id. (statement of Sen. Richard Bryan)
11. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L.
No. 102-242, § 476, 105 Stat. 2236, 2387 (1991) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-I (Supp. V
1993».
12. 15 U.S.c. § 78aa-l(a) (Supp. V 1993).
13. § 78aa-l(b).
14. See, e.g., Henderson v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 971 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 95 (1993).
15. See, e.g., Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 1 F.3d 1487 (6th Cir. 1993), cert.
granted, 114 S. Ct. 2161 (1994).
16. Morgan Stanley & Co. v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 114 S. Ct. 1827 (1994) (per
curiam).
17. Id.
18. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 114 S.Ct. 2161 (1994) granting cert. to 1 F.3d
1487 (6th Cir. 1993).
19. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991).
20. 501 U.S. 529 (1991).
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Part II of this Note will discuss the separation of powers doc
trine and survey various approaches to separation of powers analy
sis. In particular, Part II will address the difference between a
proper exercise of the legislative function which changes or modi
fies the law, and an unconstitutional prescription of a rule of deci
sion which usurps the decision making power of the judiciary. Part
III will discuss the decisions in Henderson v. Scientific-Atlanta,
Inc.,21 and Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.,22 two of the circuit court
opinions which have focused directly on the separation of powers
challenges to the new legislation. 23 Finally, Part IV will examine
the application of separation of powers analysis to the Henderson
and Plaut cases and explain why section 27A is unconstitutional.
I.
A.

BACKGROUND

Section lOeb) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule lOb-5

During the Great Depression, Congress enacted laws to pro
vide better federal regulation of the securities markets. 24 The Se
curities Act of 193325 and the Securities Exchange Act of 193426
outlined rules for the registration of securities with the Securities
Exchange Commission27 and the disclosure of relevant information
to prospective buyers and sellers of securities.
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 193428 makes it
unlawful for a person to employ "manipulative or deceptive de
vice[s]" in connection with the purchase or sale of registered securi
ties "in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
21. 971 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 95 (1993).
22. 1 F.3d 1487 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 2161 (1994).
23. The other court of appeals opinions dealing with the constitutionality of the
legislation are Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. First Republicbank Corp., 997 F.2d
39 (5th Cir. 1993), affd per curiam sub nom. Morgan Stanley & Co. v. Pacific Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 114 S. Ct. 1827 (1994); Cooke v. Manufactured Homes, Inc., 998 F.2d 1256 (4th
Cir. 1993); Cooperativa de Ahorro y Credito Aguada v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 993
F.2d 269 (1st Cir. 1993), petition for cert. filed, 62 U.S.L.W. 3299 (U.S. Oct. 12, 1993)
(No. 93-564); Berning v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 990 F.2d 272 (7th Cir. 1993); Gray
v. First Winthrop Corp., 989 F.2d 1564 (9th Cir. 1993); Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod.
Co., 977 F.2d 1533 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1841 (1993).
24. See Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1445 (1994).
25. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at
15 U.S.c. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1988 & Supp. V 1993».
26. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291,48 Stat. 881 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.c. §§ 78a-7811 (1988 & Supp. V 1993».
27. 15 V.S.c. § 78d (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
28. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1988).
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Commission may prescribe."29 The Commission later promulgated
Rule lOb-S, which prohibits fraud, the making of untrue statements,
and omissions of material facts that might tend to mislead any per
son in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.30
Although neither the statute nor the regulation expressly pro
vide a private right of action for violations, the courts have found
an implied private right of action under Rule lOb-S. 31 Over the
years, such actions have become "the most important antifraud pro
tection of the entire Federal securities laws."32 Because the Securi
ties Exchange Commission does not have adequate resources to
detect and prosecute securities fraud, private actions to uncover
and punish fraud are essential to safeguard the integrity of the se
curities markets. 33
. Rule lOb-S jurisprudence was developed in the lower federal
courts over the course of twenty-two years before the Supreme
Court addressed the subject. 34 In the years that followed, the Court
outlined the elements of a successful lOb-S claim.35 Prior to the
Lamp! decision, the statute of limitations in lOb-S cases was the
29. Id.
30. 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1993). The regulation provides as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
Id.
31. See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 800 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
32. Securities Investor Protection Act of 1991: Hearings on S. 1533 Before the Sub
comm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1991) (statement of Richard Breeden, Chairman, SEC).
33. See id.
34. See Securities and Exchange Comm'n v. National Sec. Inc., 393 U.S. 453
(1969).
35. First, the defendant must have engaged in fraud or manipulation. Santa Fe
Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 471-74 (1977). Second, the defendant must have
acted with scienter. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976). Third, the
misconduct must have related to a "material" fact. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224,
238 (1988). Finally, the misconduct must have occurred "in connection with" a securi
ties transaction. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 738 (1975). See
Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae at 13-14, Lampf,
Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991) (No. 90-333).
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subject of much confusion. 36 Since Congress did not contemplate a
private right of action under section lO(b) when it enacted section
lOeb),37 it did not include a statute of limitations,?8
B.

Method of Determining the Statute of Limitations

When Congress has provided no statute of limitations for a
federal cause of action, the traditional practice of the federal courts
is to borrow "the local time limitation most analogous to the case at
hand."39 The Supreme Court has characterized this practice as the
fulfillment of congressional expectations. 40 Despite these solid
roots, the practice presents problems which have led some courts to
develop exceptions to the rule. 41 For instance, state legislatures
probably did not have the federal cause of action in mind when
enacting the local statute of limitations. 42 Therefore, a situation
may arise where the local statute of limitations frustrates the pur
pose of the federal statute. 43 . In such a situation, the court should
look to federal law for a more suitable statute of limitations.44
The Lampf Court described a hierarchical analysis to be used
as a guide in selecting the appropriate statute of limitations for a
federal cause of action with no express statute of limitations. First,
the court must determine whether a uniform statute of limitations is
needed. 45 The need for a uniform standard may arise because the
federal cause of action tends to encompass a complex variety of
topics. 46 In such a situation, a particular local statute may be an
unsatisfactory analog from which to draw a statute of limitations.47
36. See Harold S. Bloomenthal, The Statute of Limitations and Rule lOb-5 Claims:
A Study in Judicial Lassitude, 60 U. COLO. L. REV. 235 (1989).
37. See Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 196.
38. See generally Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Se
curities Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L. REv. 385 (1990).
39. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 355
(1991) (citations omitted).
40. Id.
41. Ceres Partners v. GEL Assocs., 918 F.2d 349 (2d Cir. 1990) (departing from
pre-Lampfpractice of borrowing local statute of limitations in § 10(b) cases and look
ing instead to other provisions of the Securities Exchange Act for a suitable statute of
limitations model); In re Data Access Sys. Sec. Litig., 843 F.2d 1537 (3d Cir.) (en banc)
(same), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 849 (1988).
42. Lampf, 501 U.S. at 355.
43. Id. at 355-56.
44. Id. at 362. For examples of courts applying this rationale, see Ceres, 918 F.2d
349; In re Data Access, 843 F.2d 1537, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 849.
45. Lampf, 501 U.S. at 357.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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Second, if a uniform standard is desirable, the court must de
termine whether the source should be state or federallaw. 48 The
possibility of multi-state litigation and the attendant risk of forum
shopping are factors in this determination.49 Finally, the court must
recognize the presumption that a state statute will be borrowed. 50
To overcome that presumption, the court must find a federal statute
that is a closer fit to the federal cause of action at hand than the
available state statutes.51 Only after analyzing these factors should
a federal court determine the appropriate source of a statute of
limitations.
C.

The Statute of Limitations for an Alleged Section lOeb)
Violation

Having undertaken this analysis, the Lampf Court held that a
uniform statute of limitations was needed for actions brought under
section lO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.52 To deter
mine the appropriate statute of limitations, the Court looked for
indications of the enacting Congress' sentiment about a proper stat
ute of limitations. In other words, the Lampf Court sought to un
derstand what the Seventy-third Congress would have intended if it
had actually contemplated the private right of action recognized by
the federal courts. 53 The Court ruled that when "the claim asserted
is one implied under a statute that also contains an express cause of
action with its own time limitation, a court should look first to the
statute of origin to ascertain the proper limitations period."54
The Court found that other provisions of the Securities Ex
change Act of 1934,55 which have express time limitations, and were
enacted with the same goal in mind as section 10(b),56 provide the
48.

[d.

49. [d. (citation omitted); see also In re Home-Stake Prod. Co. Sec. Litig., 76
F.R.D. 337 (N.D. Okla. 1975) (noting that cases involving litigants from several districts
were consolidated pursuant to an order of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation).
50. Lampf, 501 U.S. at 357.
51. [d.
52. [d. at 355.
53. [d. at 359.
54.

[d.

55. 15 U.S.c. §§ 78i, 78r (1988) (originally enacted as §§ 9(e) and 18(c) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881, 890-91, 898).
56. Lampf, 501 U.S. at 360. Referring to the purposes of the various provisions of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Court noted that "[e]ach was intended to
facilitate a central goal: 'to protect investors against manipulation of stock prices
through regulation of transactions upon securities exchanges and in over-the-counter
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best analog from which to draw the statute of limitations for section
lO(b) claims. Sections 9( e) and 18(c) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, and language of the 1934 Act which amended section
13 of the 1933 Act, all contained an explicit limitations period of
one year from the date the violation was discovered, or should have
been discovered, and a limit of three years in any case from the
actual occurrence.57 The Lamp! Court therefore adopted the one
year and three year limitations periods for section 10(b) claims.
The Court also held that the new rule would apply to the par
ties in the case before it. 58 This decision had the effect of creating a
one year and three year limitations period for plaintiffs with pend
ing section 10(b) claims. 59 The applicability of the rule to pending
claims was emphatically confirmed by Justice Souter's opinion in
James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia,60 announced the same day
as Lamp/.
The Beam Court held that a previous interpretation of federal
law by the Supreme Court, made applicable to the litigants in the
case before it, was applicable retroactively to all litigants with simi
lar pending claims,61 regardless of equitable considerations such as
reliance on the old law. 62 Therefore, plaintiffs in pending Rule lOb
S cases were bound by the Court's ruling in Lamp/. The Lamp!
markets.'" Id. at 360-61 (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195
(1976». But see Securities Investor Protection Act of 1991: Hearings on S. 1533 Before
the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Af
fairs, l02d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1991) (statement of Richard Breeden, Chairman, SEC)
(noting that §§ 9(e) and 18(c), from which the Court drew its adopted statute of limita
tions, are rarely used and comparatively unimportant).
57. Lampf, 501 U.S. at 359-60.
58. Id. at 364.
59. Id. at 370 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
60. 501 U.S. 529 (1991).
61. Id. at 544. Beam dealt with a claim that Georgia's state excise tax on im
ported liquors violated the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Court held that its prior decision in Bacchus Imports, Ltd.
v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984) (invalidating an exemption from Hawaii's liquor tax given
to a locally produced product), applied to the plaintiffs claim for a refund of Georgia
excise taxes paid for the years 1982, 1983, and 1984. Beam, 501 U.S. at 533-34. The
Court reversed the Georgia Supreme Court's decision denying the plaintiffs claim, say
ing that the principles of equality and stare decisis must prevail over equitable consider
ations. Id. at 540. In effect, the Court stated that its 1984 decision in Bacchus would
control the disposition of a claim arising from events which antedated that decision.
The Court stated that the practice of making its decisions fully retroactive "reflects the
declaratory theory of law, ... according to which the courts are understood only to find
the law, not to make it." Id. at 535-36 (citations omitted).
62. Beam, 501 U.S. at 540. By discounting equitable considerations, the Court
turned away from the test for nonretroactive application of its decisions that had been
articulated in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971). The Chevron test required
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Court also made it clear that an equitable tolling of the statute of
limitations was not permissible in 10b-5 cases,63 and that the limit of
three years from the occurrence of the fraud or misrepresentation
was an absolute maximum. 64
All at once, plaintiffs across the country who had filed suit in
reliance on their forum's local statute of limitations65 were time
barred from asserting their claims. Defendants in 10b-5 suits filed
for summary judgment on the basis of the more restrictive uniform
federal statute of limitations and the cases were dismissed. 66
D.

The Congressional Response. to Lampf

The congressional response to the Lamp! ruling was the pas
sage of an amendment to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, at
tached to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement
Act of 1991.67 Section 476 of that Act amended the Securities Exthe Court to consider "the inequity imposed by retroactive application" of a new princi
ple of law. Id. at 107.
63. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 363
(1991).
64. Id. Thus, unlike some lower courts in the Second and Seventh Circuits, the
Lamp! Court left plaintiffs who had filed suit in reliance on the old law with no escape
hatch. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Ceres Partners v. GEL Assocs.,
918 F.2d 349 (2d Cir. 1990), and the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in Short
v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d 1385 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2887
(1991), had also adopted a statute of limitations based on the Securities Exchange Act
analogs. Nevertheless, at least some district courts in those circuits had held that the
one and three year limits adopted by the courts of appeals were not to be given retroac
tive effect when equitable concerns, such as reliance on the old statute, justified excep
tions. See Brown v. Hutton Group, 795 F. Supp. 1307 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Bankard v. First
Carolina Communications, Inc., No. 89-8571, 1992 WL 3694 (N.D. Ill. January 6, 1992).
65. Prior to Lamp!, federal courts adopted the local statute of limitations most
closely analogous to the case at hand. Lamp!, 501 U.S. at 355. These statutes were
usually borrowed from the local fraud statutes or the local blue-sky laws. Denise
Rodosevich, Comment, Obtaining Uniformity for Section IO(b) and Rule IOb-5 Causes
of Action, 22 CONN. L. REV. 525, 529 (1990). Therefore, the statute of limitations ap
plied to lOb-5 cases varied from one to ten years depending on the jurisdiction. Id. at
559.
66. See, e.g., Henderson v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 971 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1992);
Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 977 F.2d 1533 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
1841 (1993); Brown v. Hutton Group, 795 F. Supp. 1307 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
67. Pub. L. No. 102-242, § 476, 105 Stat. 2236, 2387 (1991) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78aa-1 (Supp. V 1993». § 476 of the Act added the following to the Securities Ex
change Act of 1934:
Sec. 27A. (a) EFFECf ON PENDING CAUSES OF ACfION.-The limitation
period for any private civil action implied under section 10(b) of this Act that
was commenced on or before June 19, 1991, shall be the limitation period
provided by the laws applicable in the jurisdiction, including principles of ret
roactivity, as such laws existed on June 19, 1991.
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change Act of 1934 by adding section 27 A.
In substance, part (a) of this legislation directed that for all
pending cases filed prior to the decision in Lamp/, the statute of
limitations in effect in each respective district on the day before the
Lamp! decision was to be applied. Part (b) of the legislation di
rected the reinstatement of any claims which had been dismissed as
time barred as a consequence of the Lamp! decision. Plaintiffs in
these dismissed suits were given sixty days in which to apply for
reinstatement.
Concern over the Lamp! decision was tied partly to the public
perception that the decision would, in effect, insulate some of the
more notorious alleged perpetrators of securities fraud in the 1980s,
including Michael Milken and Charles Keating, from lOb-5 claims. 68
While this concern over the notorious cases may have been partly
responsible for the relatively quick congressional response, the
more serious concern was that the time limits adopted by the
Lamp! Court were simply inadequate to allow the timely detection
of elaborate securities fraud schemes by private investors. 69 Even
the Securities Exchange Commission, with its many staff and legal
resources, is not able to effectively police the securities industry.70
(b) EFFECT ON DISMISSED CAUSES OF ACfION.-Any private civil action
implied under section lO(b) of this Act that was commenced on or before June
19, 1991
(1) which was dismissed as time barred subsequent to June 19, 1991,
and
(2) which would have been timely filed under the limitation period
provided by the laws applicable in the jurisdiction, including principles of
retroactivity, as such laws existed on June 19, 1991,
shall be reinstated on motion by the plaintiff not later than 60 days after the
date of enactment of this section.
Id.
68. See Kevin G. Salwen, Senate Bill Would Revive Securities Suits Dismissed
Under Supreme Court Ruling, WALL ST. J., Nov. 22, 1991, at A6.
69. Securities Investor Protection Act of 1991: Hearings on S. 1533 Before the Sub
comm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1991) (statement of Richard Breeden, Chairman, SEC). For exam
ple, a "Ponzi" scheme involves the selling of investment shares in a particular project
with the promise of regular returns on the investment. With the sale of new shares to
additional investors, the organizers of the scheme can pay dividends without having
actually purchased any investment assets. For a long period of time, as long as the
scheme is able to attract sufficient additional investment capital, the organizers can
keep investors in the dark about the fraud. See Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 977
F.2d 1533 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1841 (1993).
70. Securities Investor Protection Act of 1991: Hearings on S. 1533 Before the Sub
comm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1991) (statement of Richard Breeden, Chairman, SEC).
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The private investor is at an even greater relative disadvantage. 71
Initially, a bill was proposed which would have changed the
statute of limitations in lOb-5 cases prospectively as well as retroac
tively,72 but a compromise dropping the pro~pective sections was
finally adopted. The earlier bill, S. 1533, would have established a
statute of limitations in 10b-5 cases of two years from the date of
discovery, with an absolute maximum, or period of repose, of five
years from the actual events constituting the fraud or misrepresen
tation.73 The bill was accepted and recommended for passage by
the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,
but opposition quickly developed from the accounting, banking, in
surance, and securities industries. 74 Representatives of these
groups argued that the expansion of the statute of limitations would
invite an increase of frivolous lawsuits, resulting in greater transac
tional costs in the securities markets and a decrease in the markets'
ability to produce the capital required by our economy.7S
These arguments, made on behalf of the affected industries
rather than individual defendants, did not evoke separation of pow
ers concerns with the legislation. After the passage of section 27 A,
however, defendants who were adversely affected by the change in
the statute of limitations argued that the new law violated separa
tion of powers. 76
II.

A.

THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE

The Constitutional Principle

Despite the fact that separation of powers is not mentioned in
the Constitution, it is a fundamental principle of American constitu
tional law. 77 Nevertheless, while our system of government de
71. Id.
72. S. 1533, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
73. Id.
74. Securities Investor Protection Act of 1991: Hearings on S. 1533 Before the Sub
comm. on Securities ofthe Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1991) (statement of Sen. Dodd).
75. Id. at 153-202 (statement of Harvey L. Pitt, American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants; statement of Edward O'Brien, President, Securities Industry As
soc.; statement of Austin W. Stedham, National Association of Corporate Directors).
76. See, e.g., Henderson v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 971 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1992).
77. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714,725 (1986). "'The fundamental necessity
of maintaining each of the three general departments of government entirely free from
the control ... of the others ... is hardly open to serious question. So much is implied
in the very fact of the separation of the powers of these departments by the Constitu
tion ....'" Id. (quoting Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629-30 (1935».
See also Paul R. Verkuil, Separation of Powers, The Rule of Law and the Idea of Inde
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pends on the successful maintenance of separation of powers, this
does not mean that a complete division between the workings of
the executive, legislative and judicial branches is required.78 In fact,
to maintai~ a balance of shared power among the three branches,
and thereby prevent the concentration of too much power in one
branch, each branch must exercise a measure of review and control
over the others.19 This is the notion of "checks and balances. "80
The ability to carry out these "checks and balances" is often cited as
the raison d'etre of the separation of powers. Other theories ad
vanced in support of the separation of powers principle include the
efficiency theory81 and the legitimacy theory.82
The efficiency theory is built upon the notion that it is impracti
cal to expect a monolithic government to be able to carry out the
various functions of governing a large country. The inefficiency of
the United States government under the Articles of Confederation
is thought to have influenced the Framers of the Constitution to
separate and devolve responsibilities in the interest of getting things
done.83
The legitimacy theory was also "a matter of great concern to
legal theorists in the various ratifying conventions."84 The legiti
pendence, 30 WM. & MARY L. REv. 301 (1989). But cf Dean Alfange, Jr., The Supreme
Court and the Separation of Powers: A Welcome Return to Normalcy?, 58 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 668, 710-11 (1990) (arguing that separation of powers concerns alone can never
be enough to invalidate a statute).
78. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 693-94 (1988). "[W]e have never held that
the Constitution requires that the three branches of Government 'operate with absolute
independence.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974)). See
also Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth J. Cisar, "If Angels Were to Govern": The Need for
Pragmatic Formalism in Separation of Powers Theory, 41 DUKE L.J. 449, 462 (1991).
79. "[U]nless these departments be so far connected and blended, as to give to
each a constitutional controul over the others, the degree of separation which the
maxim requires as essential to a free government, can never in practice, be duly main
tained." THE FEDERALIST No. 48 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
80. Id. It is with this delicate balance between control and deference in mind that
the courts have applied the principle that they must construe legislation as constitu
tional if at all possible. See, e.g., Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast
Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988). Yet the courts must also
carry out their duty to interpret the law, and in so doing, must avoid "disingenuous
evasion" to find a statute constitutional. United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 96 (1985)
(citing Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 U.S. 373, 379 (1933)).
81. GARRY WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA: THE FEDERALIST 109 (1981).
82. [d. at 114-15. Wills points out that the modem conception of separation of
powers has little room for these other principles. Id. at 110.
83. But see United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 443 (1965). "This 'separation of
powers' was obviously not instituted with the idea that it would promote governmental
efficiency." Id.
84. WILLS, supra note 81, at 114.
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macy of the new government, and of governments in general, was
thought to depend on the accountability of the government, safe
guarded by separation of powers. In the late twentieth century,
however, it requires some exercise of the imagination to appreciate
the significance of the legitimacy theory for a late eighteenth-cen
tury citizen.
B.

Different Approaches to Separation of Powers Analysis

Approaches to separation of powers analysis vary from a
strictly formal approach85 to a more functional approach.86 The
formal approach focuses on the maintenance of the divisions be
tween the branches, based either on an originalist understanding of
the proper roles of the branches87 or an evolving notion of the
proper role of the branches. Commentators have pointed to the
Supreme Court's decisions and reasoning in Bowsher v. SynarB8 and
INS v. Chadha 89 as examples of the formalist approach. 90
This approach suggests that nothing but strict adherence to the
structural contours of separation of powers will be sufficient to pro
tect against the danger inherent in the accretion of power to any
branch in excess of some constitutionally permissible level. 91
Under the formalist view, any act or practice that usurps the power
of another branch of government is an impermissible violation of
separation of powers. Separation of powers analysis cannot be
solely concerned with the end result of a disputed act or practice,
i.e. whether or not an adequate balance of power remains; it is just
as much a matter of structure. 92 In other words, if the doctrine is to
85. See Arthur C. Leahy, Note, Mistretta v. United States: Mistreating the Sepa
ration of Powers Doctrine?, 27 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 209 (1990).
86. See Redish & Cisar, supra note 78.
87. See Stephen L. Carter, From Sick Chicken to Synar: The Evolution and Subse
quent De-Evolution of the Separation of Powers, 1987 B.Y.U. L. REV. 719 (1987).
88. 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (striking down a provision of the Gramm-Rudman-Hol
lings Act because it required the Comptroller General, who may be removed by Con
gress, to exercise executive power in trimming the federal budget).
89. 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (holding a provision of the Immigration and Naturaliza
tion Act unconstitutional because it gave either chamber of Congress veto power over a
suspension of deportation, without requiring approval by the other chamber or the
President).
90. See Leahy, supra note 85, at 220 n.98. But see Keith Werhan, Toward an Ec
lectic Approach to Separation of Powers: Morrison v. Olson Examined, 16 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 393, 406-10 (1989) (arguing that Bowsher does not represent a strictly for
mal approach).
91. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 730. "The Framers recognized that, in the long term,
structural protections against abuse of power were critical to preserving liberty." Id.
92. See Redish & Cisar, supra note 86, at 451.
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deliver the protection envisioned by the drafters of the Constitution
it must be defended as a structural limitation regardless of the ac
tual harm done by a particular overreaching act.
Even if there is only minimal actual harm, the usurpation of
power must be invalidated. For instance, even though Congress
might function more efficiently by taking short cuts with the legisla
tive process, Congress may not legislate without presenting a bill
for the President's signature. 93 "[T]he fact that a given law or pro
cedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of
government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the
Constitution."94
On the other hand, a functionalist approach focuses on the ulti
mate impact of a particular act or practice under review, rather than
the structural violations which are. important to a formalist analy
sis. 95 The key question in a functional analysis is whether the act or
practice results in an unacceptable accretion of power to one of the
branches. 96 Theoretically, under this approach the practice in ques
tion might be an overt exercise by one branch of the power re
served to another, yet pass the separation of powers test as long as
the consequences of the practice do not pose a threat to the future
independence of any branch. 97 Examples of this approach are the
more recent Supreme Court decisions in Morrison v. Olson 98 and
Mistretta v. United States. 99
In Morrison, the Court recognized that the power to terminate
the office of the independent counsel (investigating ethical viola
tions by members of the executive branch), given to the Special Di
vision of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia by the
Ethics in Government Act of 1978,100 was more administrative than
judicial.101 Nonetheless, the Court was able to accept this, partly
because it represented an insignificant encroachment on the execu
93.
94.

INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
[d. at 944.
95. See Redish & Cisar, supra note 78, at 490-91.
96. [d.
97. [d. at 491.
98. 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (upholding the independent counsel provisions of the
Ethics in Government Act of 1978 against a separation of powers challenge based on
the infringement of the President's power to remove executive officers and to exercise
prosecutorial discretion).
.
99. 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (upholding sentencing guidelines promulgated by the
United States Sentencing Commission against a separation of powers challenge).
100. Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (1978) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599
(1988 & Supp. V 1993».
101. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 682 (1988).
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tive power. 102
The Mistretta Court dealt with a constitutional challenge to the
involvement of federal judges as members of the United States Sen
tencing Commission. The Mistretta Court noted that the "concern
of encroachment and aggrandizement ... animated our separation
of-powers jurisprudence" while "[b]y the same token, . . . [the
Court has] upheld statutory provisions that to some degree com
mingle the functions of the Branches, but that pose no danger of
either aggrandizement or encroachment."lo3
In Mistretta,l04 Congress arguably delegated certain legislative
responsibilities to the judiciary; and yet the Court held that this
sharing of responsibilities was permissible.t o5 After all, it makes
sense for the judicial branch, with its experience in imposing
sentences, to help create the rules for sentencing. The Court recog
nized that the executive and the judicial branches could share re
sponsibility for developing sentencing rules without threatening the
coordinate status of either branch.
The categorization of an act or practice as the proper function
of one branch is not always easy.t°6 The actions of one branch can
sometimes bear a strong resemblance to the recognized functions of
another. The Court, through its ability to interpret the laws, and
Congress, through its ability to legislate, share the power to create
law. When the Supreme Court has declared a retroactive statute of
limitations applicable to a certain class of cases, and Congress then
reverses the effect of that decision, is Congress simply legislating
the statute of limitations, or is it prescribing a rule of decision in
particular cases and usurping the judicial power?
C.

The Difference Between a Change in the Law and the
Prescription of a Rule of Decision

IIi United States v. Klein,lo7 the Supreme Court held that con
gressional prescription of a rule of decision in a pending case vio
102. Id. "[T]he real question is whether the removal restrictions are of such a
nature that they impede the President's ability to perform his constitutional duty, and
the functions of the officials in question must be analyzed in that light." Id. at 691.
103. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 382 (1989).
104. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
105. Id. at 412.
106. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 749 (1986). "One reason that the exer
cise of legislative, executive, and judicial powers cannot be categorically distributed
among three mutually exclusive branches of Government is that governmental power
cannot always be readily characterized with only one of those three labels." Id.
107. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871).
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lated the separation of powers doctrine. lOS Klein involved a
plaintiff seeking payment from the United States Treasury for cot
ton which had been seized and sold by the Union government dur
ing the Civil War.109 In a prior case with similar facts,110 the Court
had determined that a Presidential pardon "cured" participation in
the rebellion, clearing the way for claimants to recover the property
they lost in the war. Shortly thereafter, a proviso attached to an
appropriations bill111 declared that pardons would henceforth be
deemed inadmissible as evidence of a rightful claim. The proviso
further declared that the existence of an uncontroverted pardon
would be taken as evidence of participation in the rebellion, rather
than as evidence of innocence. 1l2 The Klein Court held that this
proviso went too far. It characterized the legislative action as the
prescription of a "rule for the decision of a cause in a particular
way."1l3 If Congress were allowed to usurp the judicial power to
decide cases, then the judiciary would cease to operate as an in
dependent and coordinate branch within the federal system.
The Court went on to distinguish its rule in Klein from a prior
holding in Pennsylvania v. Wheeling and Belmont Bridge CO.1l4 In
an earlier proceeding, the Court had ruled that a certain low bridge
over the Ohio River, which obstructed steamboat traffic, was a pub
lic nuisance that must be abated. lls Congress reacted to the Court's
decision with a law making the bridge a part of the post road sys
tem,116 thereby protecting it from the action called for in the
Court's earlier decision. The Court found that this was a change in
the underlying law governing its decision rather than the prescrip
tion of a rule of decision. 1l7 While the change in the law did not
affect recovery for past damages, it changed the legal status of the
bridge henceforth.
In both Klein and Wheeling Bridge, legislative action effected a
reversal of a prior decision of the Supreme Court. The legislative
action was given effect by the passage of a statute in both houses of
108. Id. at 147-48.
109. Id. at 136.
110. United States v. Padelford, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531 (1869).
111. Act of July 12, 1870, ch. 251, 16 Stat. 230, 235.
112. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 144.
113. Id. at 146.
114. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 (1855).
115. Id. at 429.
116. Act of Aug. 31, 1852, ch. Ill, §§ 6, 7, 10 Stat. 110, 112.
117. Wheeling Bridge, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 431-32.
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Congress,l1S yet'the Klein Court looked through the procedural
characteristics indicating that this was a valid change in the law.
The Klein Court interpreted the language of the proviso as the pre
scription of a rule of decision, unconstitutional and impermissible,
rather than a valid change in the law. 119 To illustrate the point by
contrast, the Court referred to the legislative action in Wheeling
Bridge. The Court characterized the congressional action in that
case as a valid change in the law, leaving the Court to apply the new
rule created by the legislative branch, in accord with its duties to
interpret and apply the existing law. 120
One hundred and twenty years later, the Court revisited
Wheeling Bridge in Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society.l2l Rob
ertson involved the famous spotted owls of the Northwestern old
growth forests. The case consolidated claims made by two environ
mental groups122 alleging the violation of five federal environmen
tal statutes. 123 The environmental groups believed that by failing to
carry out the provisions of certain federal environmental protection
statutes, the Department of the Interior was not adequately pro
tecting the wildlife resources of the forests.124 On the other side
were timber industry groups,125 arguing that the environmental pro
tection statutes and Bureau of Land Management policies were cre
ating excessive burdens for the timber industry. Congress
intervened by passing a law popularly known as the Northwest Tim
118. In Klein, the relevant statute was passed as a proviso to an appropriations
bill which became law on July 12, 1870. Act of July 12, 1870, ch. 251, 16 Stat. 230, 235.
119. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146 (1871). The Court also
condemned the congressional directive to view the presidential pardons in evidence in a
manner contrary to the Court's previous decisions, but on the basis of legislative en
croachment on the executive power. [d. at 147-48.
120. Id. at 146-47.
121. 112 S. Ct. 1407 (1992).
122. The Seattle Audubon Society and the Portland Audubon Society made the
claims. Id. at 1410.
123. Id. The statutes in question were: the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA),
40 Stat. 755, ch.128 (1918) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-712 (1988 & Supp.
V 1993»; the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 83 Stat. 852 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.c. §§ 4321-4370 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992»; the National Forest
Management Act of 1976 (NFMA), 90 Stat. 2949 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1600-1687 (1988 & Supp. V 1993»; the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of
1976 (FLPMA), 90 Stat. 2744 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.c. §§ 1701-1784 (1988 &
Supp. IV 1992»; and the Oregon-California Railroad Land Grant Act (OCLA), 50
Stat. 874 (1937) (codified at 43 U.S.c. § 1181 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992». [d.
124. Robertson, 112 S. Ct. at 1410.
125. The timber industry groups were the Northwest Forest Resource Council
and the Washington Contract Loggers Association. Id.; Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Rob
ertson, 914 F.2d 1311, 1313 (9th Cir. 1990).
.
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ber Compromise. 126 The Compromise established rules requiring
the designation of certain areas as spotted owl habitats and regulat
ing timber sales in those areas for a period of time. 127 The legisla
tion also declared that the Robertson defendants' compliance with
these provisions would eliminate any liability for the federal law
claims raised by the plaintiffs in the consolidated lawsuits. 128
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit labelled the legisla
tion a violation of the separation of powers docti'ine. 129 The court
said that "the critical distinction ... is between the actual repeal or
amendment of the law underlying the litigation, which is permissi
ble, and the actual direction of a particular decision in a case, with
out repealing or amending the law underlying the litigation, which
is not permissible."130 While the former is clearly an exercise of the
legislative power, the latter usurps the judicial power.
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit on this basis. It held that the Northwest Timber Com
promise did in fact amend the applicable law, by the "operation of
the canon [of construction] that specific provisions qualify general
ones."131 While Congress did not directly amend the statute under
lying the controversy, the Court held that the separate legislation
governing the meaning of specific provisions of the underlying leg
islation had the effect of amending the law. Resting its conclusion
on the proposition that the Compromise was a change in the under
lying law, the Court declined to consider whether the Klein decision
requires the invalidation of a statute directing the decision in a case
"without amending any law."132

III.

ApPELLATE COURT CASES DEALING WITH THE NEW
LEGISLATION

To date, nine United States courts of appeals have addressed
the constitutionality of section 27 A.133 Eight of the courts have
126. Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub.
L. No. 101-121, 103 Stat. 745 (1989).
127. Robertson, 112 S. Ct. at 1411 n.1.
128. [d. at 1411 n.2.
129. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 914 F.2d at 1317.
130. [d. at 1315.
131. Robertson, 112 S. Ct. at 1414.
132. [d.
133. Axel Johnson, Inc. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 6 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 1993); Plaut
v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 1 F.3d 1487 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 2161
(1994); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. First Republicbank, 997 F.2d 39 (5th Cir. 1993),
affd per curiam sub nom. Morgan Stanley & Co. v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 114 S. Ct.
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held that section 27A is a permissible exercise of congressional
power; only one has found section 27A unconstitutional. 134 All of
these decisions (except two that simply adopted other courts' rea
soning without elaboration)135 addressed the constitutionality of
section 27 A from several perspectives. Among the challenges to
section 27 A have been claims that the legislation violates the equal
protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution. 136 Some
have also argued that the legislation violates the rule against selec
tive prospectivity articulated by the United States Supreme Court
in James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia,137 and that the prohibi
tion of selective prospectivity is constitutionally based.138 These
challenges are beyond the scope of this Note. The focus of this
Note is on the separation of powers challenge to section 27A.
A.

The Henderson v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. 139 Decision

In Henderson, a class action suit, the plaintiffs represented
some forty thousand investors who alleged that the defendant, Sci
entific-Atlanta, made fraudulent statements and material omissions
which artificially inflated the price of its stoCk. l40 The plaintiffs
claimed that they lost over $370 million as a result. 141 While the
case was awaiting trial, the Supreme Court issued the Lamp! deci
sion. Scientific-Atlanta then filed a motion for summary judgment,
which was granted,142 The plaintiffs then filed a notice of appeal,
and while the appeal was pending, Congress enacted the Federal
1827 (1994); Cooke v. Manufactured Homes, Inc., 998 F.2d 1256 (4th Cir. 1993); Coop
erativa de Ahorro y Credito Aguada v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 993 F.2d 269 (1st Cir.
1993), petition for cert. filed, 62 U.S.L.W. 3299 (U.S. Oct. 12, 1993) (No. 93-564); Bern
ing v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 990 F.2d 272 (7th Cir. 1993); Gray v. First Winthrop
Corp., 989 F.2d 1564 (9th Cir. 1993); Henderson v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 971 F.2d
1567 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 95 (1993); Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod.
Co., 977 F.2d 1533 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1841 (1993).
134. Plaut V. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 1 F.3d 1487 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 114
S. Ct. 2161 (1994).
135. Cooke V. Manufactured Homes, Inc. 998 F.2d 1256 (4th Cir. 1993); Coopera
tiva de Ahorro y Credito Aguada V. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 993 F.2d 269 (1st Cir.
1993).
136. Axel Johnson, Inc., 6 F.3d at 83; Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 997 F.2d at 46;
Gray, 989 F.2d at 1572; Henderson, 971 F.2d at 1573-74.
137. 501 U.S. 529 (1991).
138. Berning V. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 990 F.2d 272, 277 (7th Cir. 1993);
Gray V. First Winthrop Corp., 989 F.2d 1564, 1572 (9th Cir. 1993).
139. 971 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1992).
140. Id. at 1569.
141. Id.
142. Robert L. Vining, Jr., J., Henderson V. Scientific-Atlanta, No.1:88-cv-2208
RLV, (N.D. Ga.).
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Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991.143 The
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit then vacated the district
court's grant of summary judgment for the defendant. The Hender
son decision, therefore, dealt with the application of section 27A(a).
1. The Henderson Majority
The majority in Henderson viewed the enactment of section
27 A as a proper exercise of the legislature's prerogative under the
Constitution to overrule a statutory construction of the Supreme
Court. The court compared Congress' action in this context to its
enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,144 overruling the
Supreme Court's decisions in a series of civil rights cases. 145
The Henderson court addressed two arguments that section
27A was an unconstitutional violation of the separation of powers
doctrine. The first argument was that section 27A sought to render
the Lamp! decision "a nullity as a binding precedent on the lower
federal courts"146 and thereby violated the separation of powers
doctrine. The court rather quickly dismissed this contention with
the answer that such action is in fact the proper constitutional role
of Congress. 147 The court referred to the Civil Rights Act of
1991 148 as an example of a similar legislative overruling of Supreme
Court statutory construction. 149
The second argument hinged on the inquiry as to whether or
not Congress in fact changed the underlying law. This question was
crystallized as part of separation of powers jurisprudence in United
143. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L.
No. 102-242, § 476, 105 Stat. 2236, 2387 (1991) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-I (Supp. V
1993».
144. Henderson, 971 F.2d at 1571 n.4. The express purpose of the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 was to reverse the effects of a series of Supreme Court interpretations of
the civil rights statutes. See generally Michele A. Estrin, Retroactive Application of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 to Pending Cases, 90 MICH. L. REv. 2035 (1992).
145. Independent Fed'n. of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754 (1989); Pat
terson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989); Lorance v. AT&T Technologies,
490 U.S. 900 (1989); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989); Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); Craw
ford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437 (1987); Library of Congress v. Shaw,
478 U.S. 310 (1986); Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 (1986).
146. Henderson, 971 F.2d at 1571.
147. Id.
148. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
149. Henderson, 971 F.2d at 1571 n.4.
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States v. Klein. 150 The Henderson majority held that Congress had
not attempted to force the courts to reach an outcome contrary to
law, but that Congress had in fact changed the law.l5l The Hender
son court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Robertson v.
Seattle Audubon SocietyI52 to support its view. In Robertson, Con
gress had addressed a particular lawsuit and declared that compli
ance with newly enacted legislation would satisfy the laws upon
which the plaintiffs based their claims in the existing suit. The
Court found this to be a permissible change in the underlying
law. 153
The Eleventh Circuit also found it insignificant that section
27 A had only retroactive effect, whereas the statute at issue in Rob
ertson had both retroactive and prospective effect. 154 Finally, the
court held that section 27 A did not impose a rule of decision on the
courts, but allowed the courts to exercise the judicial function of
fact finding and applying the changed law to those facts.155

2.

The Henderson Dissent

Judge Wellford's dissenting OpInIOn in Henderson disagreed
with the majority's conclusion that the legislation at issue did not
violate the separation of powers doctrine. The dissent was "per
suaded that Congress infringed upon judicial authority by setting
out specific rules of decision in pending cases ... as proscribed in
United States v. Klein." 156
Judge Wellford also referred to what he estimated to be a ma
jority of the district courts that had ruled on this issue and found
the statute unconstitutional.1 57 Among these cases were Bank of
Denver v. Southeastern Capital GroupI58 and Johnston v. CIGNA
Corp.159 In Bank of Denver, the district court elaborated on the
150. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871); see supra notes 107-32 and accompanying text
for an explanation of the relevance of Klein.
151. Henderson, 971 F.2d at 1573.
152. 112 S. Ct. 1407 (1992).
153. Id. See supra notes 121-32 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Robertson decision.
154. Henderson, 971 F.2d at 1573-74.
155. Id. The court also examined and rejected arguments that § 27A was uncon
stitutional based on due process and equal protection requirements, but these are be
yond the scope of this Note. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
156. Henderson, 971 F.2d at 1576 (Wellford, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
157. Id. at 1575.
158. 789 F. Supp. 1092 (D. Colo. 1992).
159. 789 F. Supp. 1098 (D. Colo. 1992), affd, 14 F.3d 486 (10th Cir. 1993).
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distinction between Klein and Wheeling Bridge. 160 The central part
of the distinction is that Congress may change the underlying law
(as it did in Wheeling Bridge),161 but may not leave existing law
undisturbed while prescribing the effect it is to be given in the
courts (as in Klein).162 The Bank of Denver court emphasized that
Congress could have directly amended section lO(b) to impose the
desired result, but it did not, and probably could not, because it
could not agree on the desired change.1 63
In Johnston, the same court that decided Bank of Denver held
that the Robertson decision did not alter the interpretation of sec
tion 27 A either, since the legislation at issue in Robertson l64 was a
rewriting of the "statutory framework."165 In both Bank of Denver
and Johnston, the court emphasized the general threat to separation
of powers doctrine posed by the new legislation, which in the
court's view was "an encroachment on the quintessential constitu
tional attribute of the judiciary-the power to interpret the
laws."166
B.

Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc. 167

The Plaut plaintiffs were investors in "one of [Kentucky's] pre
mier thoroughbred horse farms."168 The owners of the farm, and
certain of their legal and financial advisors, were the defendants. 169
The plaintiffs purchased their shares in the farm in 1983. The suit
was brought in 1987.
Before the case came to trial, the Lamp! Court had established
the three year limit on the commencement of actions under Rule
lOb-5. Therefore, the district court dismissed the plaintiffs' suit
with prejudice on August 13, 1991.170 The plaintiffs did not appeal,
because they believed that an appeal would have been sanctionable
as frivolous, given the Lampfruling.l7l In November of 1991, when
160. See supra notes 114-20 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 114-20 and accompanying text.
162. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871).
163. Bank of Denver v. Southeastern Capital Group, 789 F. Supp. 1092, 1094 (D.
Colo. 1992).
164. Northwest Timber Compromise, Department of the Interior and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 101-121, 103 Stat. 745 (1989).
165. Johnston v. CIGNA Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1098, 1102 (D. Colo. 1992).
166. [d. See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
167. 1 F.3d 1487 (6th.Cir. 1993).
168. [d. at 1489.
169. [d.
170. [d.
171.

[d.
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Congress enacted section 27 A, the time allowed for filing an appeal
in the Plaut case had already expired. Because of this factual dis
tinction, the Plaut court focused on part (b) of section 27A, which
gave the plaintiffs the opportunity to reopen their case. The court
determined that because part (b) of section 27A allowed the re
opening of dismissed cases, it violated separation of powers
principles. 172
Perhaps not surprisingly, in light of its concern for protecting
the finality of settled questions, the Plaut court reached back to the
eighteenth century for support of its views on separation of the leg
islative and judicial powers. The court outlined the widespread
practice of legislative review of judicial decisions in the colonial pe
riod,173 culminating in "the escalation of legislative interference in
private disputes which occurred during the time of the Articles of
Confederation."174 Partly in reaction to this widespread practice,
the Framers adopted the separated powers principle. The state
ment of the crucial underlying concern is attributed to Montes
quieu: "'Were the power of judging joined with the legislative, the
life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control,
for the judge would then be the legislator."'175
The Plaut court then described an early test of the separation
of powers, Rayburn's Case. 176 After the Revolutionary War, Con
gress made pensions available to disabled veterans. The federal
courts were to accept applications for these benefits and determine
whether the applicants were indeed veterans and disabled. How
ever, the courts' decisions were reviewable by the Secretary of
War.177 In other words, Congress had given the power to overrule
the federal courts to a member of the executive branch. The fed
eral courts declined to carry out this duty, and three of the circuit
courts informed President Washington of their concerns in the form
of letters, which were later appended to the reported decision in
Rayburn's Case. 178 "This result was in essence the Court's first in
172. Id. at 1490.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 149l.
175. Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison». Montesquieu's
statement originally appeared in THE SPIRIT OF LAWS, Volume I, Book IX.
176. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792). For a thorough discussion of the factual back
ground of Hayburn's Case, see Maeva Marcus & Robert Teir, Hayburn's Case: A Mis
interpretation of Precedent, 1988 WIS. L. REv. 527,529-41 (1988).
177. Plaut, 1 F.3d at 1492.
178. The case is reported in the United States Reporter because Justices of the
Court were "riding circuit" at that time. Hayburn's Case came as a writ of mandamus
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validation of an act of Congress."179
The Plaut court read Hayburn's Case as establishing a clear un
derstanding that retroactive disturbance of final judgments of the
federal courts is prohibited. 18o While Congress has the undisputed
power to change the law, even as it applies to pending cases, Con
gress may not upset the prior application of those laws by the
courts.
Since the dismissal of a case as time-barred is a final judg
ment,181 subsequent legislation may not reverse that judgment. Be
cause section 27A(b) seeks to do precisely that, it is an
"unconstitutional usurpation of the judiciary power."182
IV.

ApPLYING SEPARATION OF POWERS CONCEPTS TO

Henderson 183 and Plautl84

A.

The Klein 185 Rule

The United States courts of appeals are in agreement that part
(a) of section 27A represents legitimate legislative change rather
than a prescribed rule of decision. 186 This view is informed by the
Supreme Court's decision in Robertson. 187 If the legislation at issue
in Robertson was a permissible exercise of the legislative function
even though it specifically addressed claims in two cases pending
appeal, then it would seem that section 27A cannot be condemned
because the intent of Congress was to address the claims of particu
lar litigants in certain cases pending appeal. The Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit held that section 27A, unlike the legislation at
issue in Klein, "did not 'direct any particular findings of fact or ap
plications of law, old or new, to fact."'l88
to the Circuit Court for the District of Pennsylvania, commanding the court to proceed
in processing William Haybum's application for veteran's benefits. The writ was ren
dered moot when Congress amended the procedure for determining pension eligibility.
Hayburn's Case,2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 409-10.
179. Plaut, 1 F.3d at 1492.
180. Id. at 1493.
181. Id. at 1495-96.
182. Id. at 1499.
183. 971 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1992).
184. 1 F.3d 1487 (6th Cir. 1993).
185. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871).
186. See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
187. Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 112 S. Ct. 1407 (1992).
188. Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 977 F.2d 1533, 1545 (10th Cir. 1992)
(quoting Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 112 S. Ct. 1407 (1992».

420

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16:397

Congress has the power to enact laws,189 but it is for the courts
to decide the outcome of cases,190 Nevertheless, laws enacted by
Congress may be given retroactive effect. 191 If such a law is passed
while a case is pending on appeal, then the appellate court must
apply the law as it exists at the time the appeal is heard 192 even if
this effects a reversal of an earlier decision. This practice is consis
tent with the declaratory function of the courtS.193
On the other hand, Congress may not prescribe the outcome of
a given case or group of cases without changing the underlying
law,194 In its most distilled form, Klein stands for the proposition
that Congress may not, within its constitutional limits, require the
courts to attach a different effect to law than the courts have previ
ously given it, without directly altering the law through legislation.
This is exactly what Congress has done in section 27 A, however. Of
course, section 27A may be viewed simply as legislation establishing
a section lOeb) statute of limitations. Reading parts (a) and (b) of
section 27A together, though, reveals the clear congressional intent
to address the outcome of a limited group of cases rather than pro
vide a general statute of limitations for section lO(b) actions.
This is not, by itself, a fatal flaw. The Robertson Court upheld
the Northwest Timber Compromise despite the fact that the legisla
tion at issue specifically addressed pending cases. 195 The legislation
at issue in Robertson, however, made general changes in the man
agement policies for the federally-owned Northwest forests.196 In
fact, by the "operation of the canon [of construction] that specific
provisions qualify general ones,"197 the Northwest Timber Compro
mise directly amended the underlying statutes.
In comparison, Congress had no intention of changing the stat
ute of limitations through section 27 A, except in the cases of partic
ular litigants. In effect, Congress sought to reach into the
189. U.S. CaNST. art. I, § 1.
190. U.S. CaNST. art. III, §§ 1, 2.
191. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204 (1988).
192. See'United States v. Schooner Peggy,S U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801).
193. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 535-36 (1991).
194. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871). The Robertson Court
declined to rule on the principle established in Klein. Robertson v. Seattle Audubon
Soc'y, 112 S. Ct. 1407, 1414 (1991).
195. Robertson, 112 S. Ct. at 1413-14; see also Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co.,
10 F.3d 1485 (9th Cir. 1993) (discussing the specific reference to a certain case in the
Civil Rights Act of 1991).
196. Robertson, 112 S. Ct. at 1413.
197. Id. at 1414.
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proceedings involving these particular litigants and change the out
come of their cases, without changing the underlying law. Whereas
the Northwest Timber Compromise changed federal law relating to
the management of wildlife habitats, section 27A made no change
in the law. Section 27A simply reversed cases which had been dis
missed and allowed a more liberal statute of limitations in pending
cases. The Lamp! rule, establishing a stringent and uniform section
lO(b) statute of limitations, remains intact. The statute of limita
tions applying to all other litigants remains as it was prior to the
passage of section 27A. There is no practical difference between
the congressional action in Klein and the congressional action in
passing section 27A.
In Klein, the Court examined legislation which changed the ap
plication of a certain law in particular cases. Proponents of Con
gress' action might have argued that such legislation effected a
change in the law, which should have been dutifully applied by the
courts. In the same way, proponents of section 27A insist that the
"new" law should be applied by the courts. Yet section 27A has
changed the law on the statute of limitations in section lO(b) cases
no more than the congressional proviso in Klein changed the law
regarding pardons for former rebels. Section 27 A only changed the
judicial treatment to be given to certain factual circumstances, i.e.,
the filing dates of claims under section lO(b).
The plaintiffs who benefitted from section 27A present a very
sympathetic case, considering that the rules of the game were
changed after they had already commenced their lawsuits. 198 To al
low Congress, however, to help the plaintiffs in this way would ob
literate the distinction between law-making and judicial decision
making. The separation of powers doctrine prohibits the prescrip
tion by Congress of a rule of decision for the courts.
By reference to Klein, the Henderson court, and the other
courts which adopted its reasoning or conclusions, applied the cor
rect test to determine whether section 27A was compatible with
separation of powers doctrine. The courts have, nevertheless, ar
rived at the wrong answer. Section 27A fails the Klein test. Section
27A is the prescription of a rule of decision by Congress, despite
the fact that it came in the guise of legislation.

198. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 370
(1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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The Meaning of Hayburn's Case199

Perhaps an even more difficult question, raised by section
27 A(b), is whether a case dismissed as time-barred and not pending
on appeal can be restored by legislative action. This was the ques
tion addressed by the Plaut court. In reaching its conclusion that
section 27A(b) violates the separation of powers, the Plaut court
relied heavily on Rayburn's Case.
There are two problems with the Plaut court's reliance on
Rayburn's Case to support its holding. First, the reported decision
did not reach the constitutional question of whether another branch
could review and overturn the final decision of a federal court. 200
The question was rendered moot by the amendment to the benefits
determination procedure which removed the courts from that pro
cess. 201 The reported decision simply announced the Court's inten
tion to follow the example of the British courts in defining the
duties and structure of the federal courts.202 No pronouncements
were made as to the appropriateness of the pension application re
view process.
Second, the Plaut court attached a significance to Rayburn's
Case that went far beyond the Supreme Court's recent statements
concerning the case. The Supreme Court has indicated that the
problem with the pension act at issue in Rayburn's Case was that it
required the federal courts to carry out non-judicial work.203 The
issue was not whether decisions of the federal courts were subject
to review by another branch.204
What Rayburn's Case makes clear is that the courts may not, in
their capacity as courts, carry out the administrative work of the
executive branch. Since it was the administrative character of the
courts' assignment under the pension act which gave rise to the con
stitutional objections, it cannot be said that Rayburn's Case stands
for the repudiation of review of proper federal court decisions. Be
cause Congress had instructed the courts to carry out an executive
199. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792).
200. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 677 n.15 (1988).
201. Rayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 409-10.
202. [d. at 413-14. For a detailed analysis of the "real" meaning of Rayburn's
Case, see Marcus & Tier, supra note 176, at 534-41.
203. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 402-03 (1989).
204. Nor was the issue whether individual Justices could participate in the admin
istrative proceedings under the pension act. This was a period of experimentation, bred
by necessity, for the new federal government, testing by practice the means of carrying
out the work of government where the Constitution left the boundaries uncertain. See
id. at 398-99.
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function, in Hayburn's Case there could be no proper federal court
decisions to be reviewed. That was precisely the problem.
The degree of concern about the improper assignment of an
executive function to the courts, such as in Hayburn's Case, may be
more difficult for a modem reader to appreciate than it was for a
late eighteenth century citizen. At that time, there was widespread
concern about separation of powers based in part on the notion that
separation was necessary to establish the legitimacy of govern
ments. 205 Judicial and executive functions could not be joined in a
legitimate government. This was the problem with the pension law
at issue in Hayburn's Case. The courts were being asked to carry
out the executive function, as commissioners rather than as judges.
Our modem focus on the "checks and balances" theory of sep
aration of powers might influence our reading of Hayburn's Case
today. This understanding of the purpose of separated powers pre
dominates, to the virtual exclusion of other separated powers theo
ries. 206 But in 1792, the issue was simply whether the courts could
carry out a plainly executive function. The real concern raised by
section 27A(b), however, is not that Congress has somehow
charged the federal courts with non-judicial tasks by asserting the
power to re-open closed cases. The real concern is that Congress
has attempted to exercise the judicial power by seeking to reverse
the fortunes of litigants in closed cases.
While Hayburn's Case seems to be an inappropriate founda
tion for the Plaut court's holding, it is only inappropriate to the
extent that the Plaut court focused on the reviewability of judicial
decisions. As shown above, this is not the real significance of
Hayburn's Case. The Supreme Court has pointed out that
Hayburn's Case really dealt with the independence of the judicial
branch. 207
C.

Formal vs. Functional Analysis

A review of the Supreme Court's decisions in Chadha, Bow
sher, Olson, and Mistretta leaves some question about the Court's
view of the proper approach to separation of powers analysis. 208 In
light of this uncertainty, both the formal and functional perspectives
205.
206.

supra note 81, at 113-16.
See supra notes 77-84 and accompanying text.

WILLS,

207. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 677-78 (1988). "The purpose of this limita
tion is to help ensure the independence of the Judicial Branch ...." [d.
208. See supra notes 85-106 and accompanying text.
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on separation of powers should be considered. However, it seems
clear that the majority of the courts of appeals have adopted a func
tional analysis, epitomized by the Henderson court's acceptance of
section 27A.209
L

The Formal Analysis

The formal analysis must begin with a determination of the
proper power of the legislative branch. 210 Through its ability to al
ter statutes which have been interpreted by the courts, the legisla
tive branch reviews and controls the judiciary. It may change the
law in response to the Court's construction of a particular stat
ute. 211 The key question raised by the enactment of section 27 A is
whether Congress has gone beyon~ its checking function and
usurped the judicial power, thereby violating the separation of
powers.
If Congress had only amended an existing law specifying the
statute of limitations in section 10(b) actions, or if Congress had
established a new provision of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
which provided a statute of limitations for all section 10(b) cases,
then it would be much easier to classify the congressional action as
the exercise of its proper constitutional power. If such were the
case, then Congress would have clearly changed the underlying law
at issue, and would have satisfied the test articulated in both Klein
and Robertson. Perhaps the best solution would have been the ex
plicit establishment of a new claim for relief for plaintiffs in securi
ties fraud cases, by the traditional legislative process.
Section 27A was addressed, however, only to the group of
cases which had been affected by the Lamp! decision. By enacting
section 27 A, Congress passed legislation which, in effect, over
turned certain decisions of the judiciary.212
The Supreme Court held in Wheeling Bridge and in Robertson
that a change in the law directed at pending cases may be constitu
tional. The change in the underlying law in Wheeling Bridge did not
209. See supra notes 183-207 and accompanying text for an analysis of the courts
of appeals' views on the constitutionality of § 27A.
210. Redish & Cisar, supra note 78, at 475.
211. E.g., the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991)
(codified in scattered sections of 42 u.s.c.). This legislation reversed a series of
Supreme Court constructions narrowing the protection afforded by the civil rights stat
utes. See generally Estrin, supra note 144.
212. Part (b) of the legislation was specifically addressed to those cases that were
already dismissed as time-barred. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-l(b) (Supp V 1993).
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affect the plaintiff's right to recovery for past damages, i.e., those
incurred before the law was changed .. The Wheeling Bridge legisla
tion had a strictly prospective effect. In Robertson, the new rules
outlined in the legislation at issue applied to future conduct in com
pliance with the relevant environmental statutes. In neither case
did the Court accept the notion that Congress could upset the judi
ciary's disposition of claims in particular cases through legislation
enacted solely for that purpose.213 Therefore, under a formal analy
sis, section 27A is unconstitutional.
2.

The Functional Analysis

The functional analysis involves a balancing of the legislative
branch's power to change the law and the judiciary's ability to make
independent decisions, with an emphasis on the ultimate impact of
a certain piece of legislation on each branch's ability to carry out its
prescribed function in the future. The Mistretta Court explained the
functional concerns relating to the Judiciary:
In cases specifically involving the Judicial Branch, we have ex
pressed our vigilance against two dangers: first, that the Judicial
Branch neither be assigned nor allowed "tasks that are more
properly accomplished by [other] branches," and, second, that no
provision of law "impermissibly threatens the institutional integ
rity of the Judicial Branch."214
The courts of appeals have failed to acknowledge the impact that
congressional reversal of judicial decisions could have. While it is
undisputed that a law can be given full retroactive effect by Con
gress,215 it is another matter to allow legislation to reverse the
courts' disposition of cases decided under the law applicable at the
time of the decision. While Congress may reinstate claims against
the United States through the enactment of legislation,216 it may
not upset the expectations of private parties in a settled lawsuit.
If the separation of powers is to serve us for the next two cen
turies, the independence of the judicial branch must be maintained.
The importance of this principle has been recognized since at least
213. But cf United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371 (1980) (waiv
ing the United States' defense of res judicata to permit rehearing on Sioux claims). In
Sioux Nation, Congress acted both as legislative body and party to the case.
214. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 383 (1989) (quoting Morrison v.
Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 680-81 (1988) and Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor,
478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986), respectively).
215. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204 (1988).
216. See United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371 (1980).
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the time of Hayburn's Case. The power to direct the courts to hear
certain cases which have already been dismissed certainly repre
sents a threat to "the institutional integrity of the Judicial
Branch."217
"The hydraulic pressure inherent within each of the separate
Branches to exceed the outer limits of its power, even to accomplish
desirable objectives, must be resisted."218 While section 27A favors
a class of sympathetic plaintiffs-those left without a remedy by the
Lamp! Court-the broader implication of a rule such as section
27A is a clearly unacceptable accretion of power to the legislative
branch. It is not difficult to imagine other groups of influential liti
gants, having lost in court, petitioning Congress for a "second
chance." Section 27A survives neither the formal nor the func
tional analyses. 219
CONCLUSION

Viewed from any of the perspectives discussed in this Note, it
would seem that Congress has overstepped its bounds. If Congress
could not muster a consensus on the proper statute of limitations in
section lO(b) cases then it should not be allowed to act to overturn
a decision made by the Court in a particular class of cases. It is
tempting to adopt the result which would allow these cases to be
decided on their merits, and a sense of justice for the claimants ex
erts a strong pressure to do so. If the integrity of the judicial branch
is to be preserved for future decision-making, however, its power to
render final decisions must be respected.
Perhaps the judiciary turned its back on thousands of honest
and hard working investors who were swindled and foreclosed from
recovery by the Lamp! decision. While the Supreme Court's deci
sion in Lamp! may have been unfair to plaintiffs with pending lOb-5
claims, it would also be unfair to defendants who had successfully
moved for dismissal under the rule of Lamp! to reverse the out
come of their cases. The challenge of the separation of powers doc
trine is to promote justice and the rule of law by protecting the
realm of each branch from the encroachments of the others. An
217. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 383 (quoting Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v.
Schor, 978 U.S. 833, 851 (1986».
218. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983).
219. For the opposite conclusion, at least as to § 27A(a), see Craig W. Palm, The
Constitutionality of Section 27A of the Securities Exchange Act: Is Congress Rubbing
Lampf the Wrong Way? 37 VILL. L. REv. 1213, 1308 (1992).
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expeditious solution to the problem of a particular class of plaintiffs
can bring much greater uncertainty to all future litigants.
What makes this a difficult case is that certain plaintiffs had
rights taken away from them by the Court, and Congress simply
acted to restore those rights. Nonetheless, the structural nature of
the separation of powers requires that Congress be restrained from
usurping judicial power. Section 27A(a) is unconstitutional because
it prescribes a rule of decision for the courts without changing the
underlying law any more than Congress changed the law in the
Klein case. Part (b) is unconstitutional because it threatens the in
dependence of the judiciary. The courts focusing on section 27A(a)
have used the correct test, but reached the wrong result. The Plaut
court, which focused on part (b), reached the correct result, but
through reliance on the wrong analysis.
John D. McNally

